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Abstract
Purpose -The enforcement of the new Securities Law (SL 2020) of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in March 2020 presents a perfect opportunity to review the criminal enforcement of insider 
dealing cases in China’s securities market and to provide feasible suggestions for improvement for 
a more coherent and streamlined insider dealing regulatory framework in the PRC. 
Design/approach -Through analysing the previous literature on public interest theories and 
economic theories of regulation, this article examines the necessity to regulate insider dealing in 
China with criminal law to ensure fairness and avoid monopolies in its securities market. The 
article reviews the criminalising of severe insider dealing cases in China from the Nanking National 
Government in the 1920s to the inception of the securities market of the PRC in the 1990s to the 
present day. The investigation, prosecution, enforcement, and trial of criminal offences of insider 
dealing in China are thoroughly examined. 
Findings - The article finds a tendency for over reliance on the investigation and the administrative 
judgement of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in criminal investigation, 
prosecution, and trial in the PRC. 
Originality/value - The article is one of the first articles to critically and thoroughly analyse the 
criminal enforcement of insider dealing in China following the recent enforcement of China’s new 
Securities Law in March 2020.
Keywords Insider Dealing, Criminal Enforcement, China, Securities Market, Financial Regulation
Article classification Scholarly Article/ The construction or testing of a model or framework
Introduction
A financial market has a variety of functions, such as effectively diversifying investment risks and 
optimally allocating resources. Of all the factors that contribute to the fulfilment of such functions, 
the market’s reputation for integrity is one of the most important; however, this may be severely 
undermined by financial misconduct, which subsequently has a negative impact on the economy 
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as a whole. Insider dealing as an example of such misconduct is not new. It occurs when a person 
uses privileged material information obtained by virtue of his or her position to trade in the subject 
securities. It is argued that those in positions of trust, such as directors, officers, and beneficial 
owners, not only dishonestly advance their own interests by using non-public price-sensitive 
information, but they also jeopardise the interests of uninformed investors, since they are put at an 
unfair disadvantage. This leads to a loss of confidence in the integrity of financial markets.
The significance of the securities markets in China in the development of the economy cannot be 
overestimated. However, the importance of these markets is not limited to their role as allocators 
of capital resources. The markets are vital vehicles for the Chinese in the path to a new economy 
where market forces are acknowledged and given a degree of respect that would have been 
unimaginable even just 30 years ago.1
To ground the article firmly in the study of criminal law, we initially concentrate on the various 
theories that have been developed to justify the intervention of law in the creation and maintenance 
of viable and efficient markets. This is of real and practical significance to policy makers in China, 
as the role of the law is still not as obvious as it might be in more established mixed economies. 
We then focus specifically on the justifications for criminalising insider dealing and the 
evolvement of the criminal enforcement of insider dealing in China from the Nanking National 
Government in the 1920s up to the present day. The present regulatory system being developed 
tends more to address perceived issues of international compliance then perhaps the realities of the 
Chinese markets. We then look in some depth at the criminal sanctions imposed on insider dealing 
and its prosecution, trial, and enforcement in China. Next, we consider how best to address the 
weaknesses that have been identified in the Chinese regime in the hope of assisting in a more 
efficacious approach to the enhancement of legal deterrence and the promotion of market integrity.
Public interest theories and economic theories of regulation as a theoretical basis for 
regulating insider dealing 
Using the tool of marginal utility analysis, welfare economists link government intervention with 
market imperfections and social welfare. Theories of regulation originate from the public interest 
theories of welfare economics (Hale, 1987; Domas, 2003). Pigou (1952) suggests that when there 
1 On 24 July 1984, Beijing Tianqiao Department Co. Ltd., the first share-holding company, was incorporated after 
such practice disappeared in China for decades: CSRC, China Securities Regulatory Commission Annual Report 
2007 (2011) <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/annual/200812/P020090225529643752895.pdf> accessed 
10 May 2020.  
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is a negative externality and when the ‘marginal net social product is less than marginal net private 
product’, government intervention, especially a tax, is required. Pareto argues that good 
government intervention should not only contribute to the increase in the overall welfare of society, 
but it should also ensure that the welfare of any individual will not be worse (Francis, 1993). Kaldor 
and Hicks expanded Pareto’s theory, proposing that if those who are made better off can pay 
sufficient compensation to those who are made worse off and improve the welfare of both, it is 
likely to result in a Pareto optimal outcome (Fujimura and Weiss, 2000).
Public interest theories have received wide acceptance (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). They aim to 
show that markets are not only fragile but also operate with imperfect competition, thereby 
allowing monopolies, externalities, and imperfect information. Imperfect competition leads to 
market failure, which can reduce social welfare and the efficiency of resource allocation (Ogus, 
1994). Consequently, public interest theories argue for the necessity of regulation from a normative 
perspective, that is, to rectify market failures, increase the efficiency of resource allocation, and 
maximise social welfare. However, not all authors agree that public law should be the first choice 
in ratifying market failures. Ogus, for example, astutely argues that private law and market 
instruments should be the first choice; only when ‘market failure’ coincides with ‘private law 
failure’ can there be a prima facie case for government intervention in the public interest (Buckle 
and Thompson, 2004, p.12). 
Public interest theories have been criticised for not taking into account the possibility of regulators 
being influenced by personal interests or being effectively ‘captured’ by those who are set to 
supervise. This criticism has led to the development of economic theories of regulation (Stigler, 
1971, pp.1-3). Posner argues that regulation is actually a device used by politicians to seek favoured 
votes and other contributions from those who will receive valuable benefits from them in return 
(Posner, 1974). According to research on regulatory development in the US, Stigler concludes that 
regulation is likely to be implemented to serve the needs of the regulated industry, especially 
specific-interest groups within the industry (Stigler, 1971, pp.1-3). 
Since its re-emergence in the late 1980s China’s securities market has been subject to prudential 
regulation in which the government has played a dominant role in order to protect the interests 
of investors and promote the public interest. It seems to suggest that public interest theories have 
largely been advocated by the legislators. However, the government has been criticised for 
overregulating the markets and, in fact, replacing the market mechanism with significant 
influence over the market prices of securities. China’s securities market is thus also called a 
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‘policy market’ (Peng and Xiao, 2002; Pan and Mei, 2002). This special role of the government 
in China’s securities market has not only been widely criticised by ordinary investors and 
researchers but has been viewed as being responsible for the prevalence of insider dealing in 
China (Li and Tan, 2010). Thus it seems at least arguable that economic theories of regulation 
also have a role to play in China’s securities regulations.
If the regulation is likely to be implemented to serve the needs of the regulated industry as Stigler 
found, and it could serve as a device used by politicians to seek favoured votes and other 
contributions from those who will receive valuable benefits from them in return as Posner argued, 
it is then essential to find ways to distance the regulation and enforcement from the regulators of 
the industry in question to avoid the potential ‘revolving door’ situation. For the securities market, 
more specifically for insider dealing cases, one of the methods could be imposing criminal 
sanctions on insider dealing cases so that the prosecutors and the courts can take the lead on the 
sanction instead of the securities regulators, which would be the CSRC, the designated regulator 
of the securities markets under the State Council in the context of China.
Criminalising severe insider dealing cases in China
Prior to the inception of the People’s Republic of China, the Nanking National Government 
enacted two Criminal Acts in 1928 and 1935 respectively, which contained a number of 
provisions concerning insider dealing.i Article 335 of the Criminal Law 1928 could be read as 
imposing insider dealing liability on tippees (any unauthorised person who disclosed ‘the 
industrial and commercial secret’ obtained by virtue of his or her employment), punishable by 
up to one year’s imprisonment, criminal detention, or a fine of up to 1,000 Yuan. Article 317 of 
the Criminal Law 1935 further prohibited any person who was obliged to keep industrial and 
commercial secrets he or she knew or had obtained in accordance with the law or contract from 
leaking such information without legitimate reason; any contravention was punishable by up to 
one year’s imprisonment, criminal detention, or a fine of not more than 1,000 Yuan. Article 318 
doubled the maximum prison term and amount of fine if the offender was a public servant or ex-
public servant in possession of information gained by virtue of his or her current or previous 
office. After almost half a century, the securities markets in China were gradually reduced and 
eventually disappeared as a result of the establishment of a highly centralised economic structure 
that had heavily relied on administrative management since 1949 (CSRC, 2008).
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It was not until the early 1980s that they re-emerged thanks to a great many structural reforms, 
economic as well as political, that had been taking place since 1978 (Li, 2008). The unfortunate 
corollary of the rapid growth of China’s economy, however, had been an increasing amount of 
insider dealing, which became a target of central government enforcement in order to maintain 
public confidence in the integrity of the markets from the end of the 1980s. 
Proceeding from efforts made by local governments, the State Council (SC) and the Securities 
Committee of the State Council (SCSC), at central government level, brought in the Interim 
Provisions for the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks 1993 (IPMITS 1993) and 
the Interim Measures on Prohibition of Securities Fraudulent Conducts (IMPSFC 1993). Criminal 
and civil liabilities were touched upon lightly in articles 77–78 of the IPMITS 1993 and article 
13 of the IMPSFC 1993. Despite the good start provided by the above regulations, it was still 
some considerable time before insider dealing was pronounced a criminal offence. The next 
legislative effort was article 147 of the Company Law 1993, which prohibited sponsors of a 
company from transferring their shares within three years of the date of the company’s 
incorporation, and obliged directors, supervisors, and managers to file an ownership report and 
prohibited them from transferring shares during their term of office.
With the high incidence of market manipulation, insider dealing, fraud, misrepresentation, and 
other irregularities, China’s securities markets in the late 1990s were in a state of chaos. The 
situation called for the urgent enactment of a unified securities law. In 1996, an Advisory 
Committee was appointed by the CSRC, consisting of Professor Barry Rider, Mr Tom Newkirk 
,(the Deputy Head of the then Enforcement Division of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission), a leading US securities lawyer, and the Chairman of the Australian Stock 
Exchange. Finally, after a number of years on the drawing board, the Securities Law 1998 of 
PRC (SL 1998) came into effect.
The Criminal Law 1997 of PRC (CL1997) replaced the Criminal Law of PRC 1979 and made 
insider dealing a criminal offence. Article 180, which criminalises insider dealing, has been 
revised twice, first by Amendment I 1999 and then by Amendment VII 2009 to the CL 1997, and 
represents an extension of criminal liability for insider dealing. Most notably, Amendment VII 
2009 enables business units, corporate persons, and certain practitioners working for financial 
intermediaries to be the subjects of insider dealing crime. The business units and corporate 
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persons will be fined, and the personnel directly responsible will be sentenced to up to five years 
in prison. Practitioners working for financial intermediaries, such as stock exchanges, future 
exchanges, securities companies, future brokers, fund management companies, business banks, 
and insurance companies, are also included in the list of ‘insiders’ by Amendment VII 2009. 
In 2012, the Supreme People’s Court of China (SPC) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
(SPP) promulgated the Interpretation of Certain Issues Related to the Specific Application of 
Laws in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Insider Dealing and Divulgation of Insider 
Information 2012 (IID 2012), which provides further guidance on specific issues of insider 
dealing offences.
Article 180 of the CL 1997, para. 1 provides for two offences of insider dealing that prohibit 
individuals and entities from engaging in three classes of conduct in specific circumstances. The 
first offence is that of dealing on inside information. A person in possession of inside information 
as an insider, whether his or her possession is legal or illegal, is guilty of insider dealing if he 
deals in price-affected securities or futures based upon inside information prior to its disclosure. 
The second offence relates to disclosing inside information. This has two limbs: (1) disclosing 
inside information to another person, and (2) encouraging, expressly or impliedly, another to deal 
on the inside information or to disclose the information. In order to constitute an offence of 
insider dealing, as well as other crimes, under the CL 1997, four elements must be satisfied: (1) 
an individual or unit must have information as a ‘person in possession of inside information’ or 
an ‘illegal obtainer of inside information’; (2) the information possessed must be inside 
information; (3) the insider must have engaged in prohibited insider dealing activities; and (4) 
the suspected insider dealing must be conducted intentionally, meaning that the insider has clear 
knowledge of the consequence of his or her activities.
Criminal liability for each offence of insider dealing attaches not only to individuals but also to 
business units or other legal persons, such as unincorporated associations, partnerships, or firms 
comprising a group of individuals. Although the CL 1997, article 180, para. 1 and the IID 2012, 
article 1 define an ‘insider’ as a ‘person with knowledge of inside information on securities and 
futures trading’, which excludes business units or other legal persons, the CL 1997, article 180, 
para. 2 and the IID 2012, article 11 state that when a business entity commits any offence of 
insider dealing and falls within any of the circumstances in the IID 2012, article 6, the entity shall 
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be liable for insider dealing. Therefore, criminal liability for insider dealing offences may attach 
to both individuals and legal persons. Depending on the gravity of the violation, the penalties for 
insider dealing offences range from imprisonment or detention of no more than five years and/or 
a fine of one to five times the profit gained or loss avoided, to imprisonment of between five and 
ten years and a fine of one to five times the profit gained or losses avoided. If the offender is a 
business unit, those who are directly in charge of the business are liable to imprisonment or 
detention of not more than five years. In a case where insider dealing is committed by multiple 
defendants, each defendant shall be convicted and punished according to the cumulative value of 
the securities traded, the security deposit occupied, and the profit gained or the loss avoided, 
while the fine imposed should not exceed five times the illegal profits. In cases where insiders 
have not actually made any profits from the unauthorised disclosure of inside information to a 
third party or from encouraging that party to trade in the affected securities, article 10, para. 2 of 
the IID 2012 states that the amount of the fine imposed shall be determined according to the value 
of the profit gained or loss avoided by the beneficial party of the inside information who engaged 
in insider dealing activities based on the information.
There are provisions in the IID 2012 to the effect that no person may be subject to criminal 
penalties for violation of article 180, para. 1 of the CL 1997 if it can be proved that the trading 
in question was pursuant to a legal agreement or any other means of purchasing shares of a listed 
company, written contracts, instructions, or plans made in advance or if the information has been 
made publicly available. 
Prosecution of criminal offences of insider dealing in China 
In China, the Prosecution Services, also known as the People’s Procuratorates (PPs), have 
acquired exclusive power under the 1982 Constitution, the CL 1997, and the Criminal Procedures 
Law to prosecute the cases transferred by the Public Security Organs of China (PSOs) following 
a criminal investigation. Prosecution of insider dealing has not had a long history in China, as 
insider dealing was not criminalised until 1997, and it was not until 2003 that the first case was 
brought successfully under article 180 of the CL 1997.
In this first insider dealing case, namely, the Shenshen Fang case, two defendants, Mr Huanbao 
Ye and Ms Jian Gu, were subsequently convicted of insider dealing and sentenced to three and 
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four years’ imprisonment respectively, and Gu’s illegal gains were confiscated. The case was 
widely welcomed as the first criminal prosecution of insider dealing under article 180 of the CL 
1997.
In 2010, the PP of Nantong City of Jiangsu Province charged Mr Baochun Liu, at that time the 
Director of the Economic Committee of Nanjing Municipal Government, and his wife, Ms 
Qiaoling Chen, with insider dealing under article 180 of the CL 1997. The case attracted 
widespread attention because it was the first insider dealing prosecution against a government 
officer. The Intermediate Court of Nantong found that Liu had inside information by virtue of his 
post in the Nantong Municipal Government and subsequent appointment to participate in the 
project of the reconstruction of a listed company as an insider within article 74 of the SL 2005 
(now article 51 of the SL 2020). He violated insider dealing prohibitions under article 73 (now 
article 50 of the SL 2020) of the SL 2005 and article 180 of the CL 1997 by willingly and 
knowingly disclosing the information to his wife and trading in the affected securities. He was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and fined 760,000 Yuan for insider dealing. His wife was 
also convicted of insider dealing but received only an order for the confiscation of her illegal 
gains without any imprisonment, as the court considered her an accessory in the insider dealing 
conspiracy.
As in other countries, prosecution of insider dealing n China has never been an easy task. Even 
so, the Amendments I and VII of the CL 1997 had been powerful weapons against insider dealing 
offenders, and the introduction of the IID 2012 provides a practical guideline for the PPs to 
prosecute offenders, whether individuals or companies, for their abuse of inside information.
Investigation and court trial of insider dealing criminal cases in China
In 1998, the promulgation of the long-awaited Securities Law with specific insider dealing 
provisions and Criminal Law amendments might have justified the expectation of vigorous 
enforcement by the government to deter insider dealing. Two decades on, it is fair to say that 
China has taken steps to build up the regime of inside dealing regulation with the assistance of 
overseas experience, and its desire to tackle insider dealings should be recognised and applauded.
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On the one hand, the SC has prioritised combating insider dealing. In a 2010 Opinion on 
Combating Insider Dealing Cases in Capital Market in Accordance with the Law (Opinion 2010), 
multiple government agencies, including the CSRC, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) were required to cooperate and to tackle insider dealing activities that had become 
‘more hidden and complex since the trading launch of stock index futures’ together. ii
Pursuant to the Opinion 2010, insider dealing has become a high priority for the enforcement 
programme of the CSRC. An enhanced relationship between the CSRC and two stock exchanges 
and the Economic Crime Investigation Department of the Ministry of Public Security of China 
(ECID) has been established, thereby enabling it efficiently to receive referrals of the clues of 
suspected cases and to make referrals to the PSOs.
The courts have also placed the prosecution of insider dealing high on their agenda. Although 
article 180 of the CL 1997 was not used until 2003, six years after insider dealing was 
criminalised in 1997, the number of criminal cases suggests a subsequent increase. It has, 
collaborating with the SPP, the MPS, and the Ministry of Justice, promulgated a number of legal 
guidelines on insider dealing. Among these rules, the most important is the IID 2012, which 
redefines the scope of ‘insider’ and ‘inside information’. It also clarifies the standards for 
identifying the seriousness of the circumstances of insider dealing offences. The IID 2012 has 
been generally welcomed.
While recognising the efforts of the CSRC and the courts in attempting to curb insider dealing, 
the overwhelming view, particularly of investors, commentators, and legal professionals, 
however, is that insider dealing regulations have not been adequately enforced. One aspect of 
the insider dealing debate in China has been the constant reference to the scarcity of cases 
combined with lenient sentences. The difficulties of detection and identification are great, and 
the CSRC and the courts have not really addressed this issue. The work undertaken by Guo in 
interviewing people from the financial, regulatory, judicial, and legal sectors concludes that, 
although the precise extent cannot be quantified, insider dealing does occur with great frequency 
throughout the financial industry and business world. It is hard to find anyone who is willing to 
give credit to the enforcement, both public and private, of insider dealing regulations from 
Page 9 of 19 Journal of Financial Crime
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Crim
e
individual investors (Guo, 2012, p. 442). Many hold a much more negative approach, such as 
one lawyer, who said:
The laws (of insider dealing and other securities irregularities) are only a ‘face job’ without any 
substantial deterrence. Neither do they have any enforceability. The CSRC has vowed to protect 
individual investors in China, but investors’ confidence cannot be won unless they witness a 
satisfactory and convincing enforcement record. It is true that the CSRC sometimes does enforce 
the laws, but its hands are usually tied because of too many concerns. There is a general belief in 
the industry that insider dealing regulations are fearless, as they are not enforceable. There are 
not too many administrative cases, a very small number of criminal cases, and even fewer civil 
cases, and no attempt is made by either the CSRC or the courts to protect investors by assisting 
them to recover their losses resulting from insider dealing. It is impossible to win a civil litigation 
in China. A prosecution would be successful only if the offender were deemed ‘evil’ by the 
government.iii
The general disappointment over the CSRC enforcement of the insider dealing law reflects poorly 
on regulation and may be interpreted as a worrying public distrust of the government. It is clear 
that the regulators of the securities markets and the judiciary face real problems in the 
enforcement of insider dealing regulations, especially in terms of finding and retaining 
experienced staffing and adequate funding.iv
Criticisms of the enforcement of criminal insider dealing cases
The disappointment is worsened by the wide criticism on the over reliance on the CSRC in the 
criminal investigation and criminal enforcement of insider dealing cases.
The existing investigative power of the CSRC is backed by the Public Security Organs of China 
(PSOs). The investigators of the CSRC Enforcement Bureau have the power to enter relevant 
workplaces to conduct inspections and investigations, and to exercise the power to copy documents, 
conduct an enquiry, freeze properties, seal up properties, and restrict transactions, etc. These 
powers are backed by the PSOs. According to article 2 of the Notice for Strengthening Enforcement 
Cooperation for Combating Securities and Futures Related Crime in 2006, those who hinder CSRC 
investigators from entering relevant workplaces to conduct inspections and investigation, and to 
exercise their power to copy documents, conduct an enquiry, freeze properties, seal up properties, 
and restrict transactions, etc., or those who refuse to be questioned by the CSRC investigators, are 
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suspected of violating the administration of public security and will be punished. After the 
investigation, the CSRC will collect relevant evidence in a timely manner and issue a ‘Transfer 
Letter on Obstructing CSRC Law Enforcement’ and pass it to the PSOs for them to investigate and 
punish in accordance with law. According to article 4 of the 2006 Notice, anyone concealing, 
transferring, selling, or damaging the properties seized, sealed up, or frozen by the CSRC, or 
forging, concealing, or destroying evidence or providing false testimony or misrepresenting the 
case, thus affecting the CSRC's lawful handling of cases, will be subject to administrative penalties 
or criminal penalties by the public securities bureaus where appropriate. In accordance with article 
5 of the Several Rules on the PSOs’ Handling of Economic Crime Cases in 2005,v the CSRC shall 
promptly report suspicious transactions to the PSOs and ask for cooperation in conducting an 
investigation during everyday supervision and the investigation of securities and futures offences. 
The PSOs then decide whether to launch an investigation and file a criminal case according to the 
investigation. When transferring insider dealing cases to the PSOs, the CSRC has to enclose 
investigation reports of the suspected crime and lists of the evidence and findings according to the 
Notice on Enforcement Cooperation in Combating Crime in Security and Future Markets by the 
CSRC in 2006. Article 29 and article 30 of the Several Rules 2005 state that the PSOs have the 
power to summon, detain, and arrest suspects and to search, detain, and freeze properties when 
investigating economic crime cases. The PSOs, therefore, are equipped with a wider range of more 
extensive powers in economic crime investigation compared with the CSRC. 
The first major concerns regarding the CSRC conducting criminal investigations is that the 
investigative power of the CSRC Enforcement Bureau is limited compared with some powerful 
counterparts, such as the Division of Enforcement of the US Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The Enforcement Bureau of the CSRC does not have the power to summon the parties 
concerned. This has been one of the major obstacles for the CSRC to extract evidence from 
uncooperative parties concerned, as much staff time was spent on travelling between different 
venues to collect evidence and witness statements whilst the number of staff of the CSRC 
Enforcement Bureau was insufficient because of the growing demand for investigation (Xiao, 
2013). Further, if any of the concerned parties gives a false statement, the CSRC Enforcement 
Bureau does not have power to impose any sanction for perjury. This lack of legal deterrence 
entails zero cost for forgery. Meanwhile, the CSRC Enforcement Bureau does not have the power 
to tap parties concerned with a wiretap like the relevant department of the SEC. This means another 
loss of an opportunity for accurate intelligence. The CSRC Enforcement Bureau is therefore 
deemed to have insufficient investigative power to extract truthful evidence and financial 
intelligence for insider dealing criminal cases. 
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The second concern regarding the CSRC’s ability to conduct criminal investigations is based on 
the geographically unbalanced allocation of the investigative resources of the CSRC. Currently, 
criminal investigations of the securities and futures-related cases are mainly conducted by the 
headquarters of the CSRC Enforcement Bureau and two special agent offices in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen (where the two Chinese stock exchanges are located), and these are supplemented by 
regional CSRC Enforcement Bureau offices within CSRC regional branches. Among all of the 
regional CSRC Enforcement Bureau offices, the offices in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing, and 
Guangdong are the ones with most resources and equipped with sufficient staff. However, the 
CSRC Enforcement Bureau offices in the economically deprived western regions are very poorly 
equipped in terms of both funding and human resources. Consequently, the investigative resources 
have been overly concentrated in the economically more developed southeast region of China, 
which results in an overlap and subsequent waste of resources. The uneven allocation of 
investigation resources creates further difficulties for the CSRC Enforcement Bureau Headquarter 
when it has to join forces with the CSRC regional branches to investigate cross-region offences. 
In 2008, the Ministry of Public Security formed a special task force, the Crime Investigation 
Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (Securities Crime Investigation Bureau hereafter) in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Dalian, Wuhan, and Chengdu, to investigate securities and futures 
related-criminal cases. Consequently, a Notice on Several Issues Concerning the Application of 
Criminal Procedure of the Crime Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security’s 
Investigation of Securities and Futures Related Criminal Cases 2008 was produced.vi According 
to article 3 of the 2008 Notice on Several Issues, the Crime Investigation Bureau exercises criminal 
investigation power delegated by the Criminal Procedure Law on insider trading and divulging 
inside information cases, and has the power to decide to summon, summon by force, impose bail, 
carry out residential surveillance, or carry out detention in accordance with the laws and regulations. 
In practice, however, the Crime Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security has not 
been carrying out the investigation and detection role of insider dealing criminal cases. Rather, the 
Crime Investigation Bureau’s role is more to verify the evidence gathered by the CSRC 
Enforcement Bureau. 
During the investigation, prosecution, and court trial, the PSOs, the PP, and the courts have given 
up a large portion of independent judgement on the identification of key facts of insider dealing 
criminal cases, such as the identification of the sensitive period of inside information and the 
identification of insiders. In particular, the courts, instead of being provided with solid evidence 
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from both parties to draw their own conclusion, largely rely on the official confirmation letter 
issued by CSRC to decide on key facts, such as the identification of ‘insider information’ and the 
‘sensitivity period’ of the stock price. The sensitivity period of the inside information is one of the 
most significant elements in deciding whether there has been a breach of article 180 of the Criminal 
Law and in calculating the amount of monetary fine payable and the length of prison sentences to 
be served by the offender should there be a successful conviction. 
The heavy reliance on the insider dealing confirmation letters of the CSRC as absolute evidence in 
the courts has been demonstrated in recent cases. Among the 63 insider dealing criminal case 
judgements dating from 10 March 2003 to 8 November 2019, 25 out of the 63 judgements recorded 
that the investigation of the public securities bureaus, the prosecution of the protectorates, and the 
judgements of the courts were made based on the official confirmation letters and/or the official 
transfer letters issued by CSRC. viiAll but two defendants in those 25 cases questioned the legal 
effect of the confirmation letters and the official transfer letters as evidence; both appeals were, 
however, dismissed by the courts. In the criminal judgement of Zhongyi Wang and Yihong Wang 
Insider Trading and Divulging Inside Information,viii defendant Zhongyi Wang disputed the 
legitimacy of using the confirmation letter of the CSRC as evidence. The court dismissed the appeal 
based on article 4 of Opinions on Handling Securities and Futures-Related Criminal Cases by the 
People’s Supreme Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and 
the CSRC 2011 (Opinion 2011)ix which states that PSOs, PPs, and the courts may, in the course 
of handling suspected securities and futures-related criminal cases, ask the CSRC to appoint 
professional officials to assist in checking and copying the relevant materials. The CSRC may, in 
accordance with their needs, provide legal opinions for the PSOs, procuratorates, and the courts. 
The court concluded that the official confirmation letter was essentially the CSRC providing a 
professional opinion on the securities and futures criminal cases in accordance with Opinion 2011. 
It can therefore be relied on as evidence. However, article 4 of the Opinion only says the court may 
ask the CSRC to ‘check and copy relevant materials’ and ‘issue legal opinions’, which does not 
necessarily mean that the court must adopt those ‘legal opinions’ as absolute evidence. In reality, 
the courts use those ‘legal opinions’ directly as evidence and do not dispute them. In the criminal 
judgement of Bribery, Insider trading and Divulging Inside Information of Shangdong Zhicheng 
Group Companies and Xu, the court dismissed the defendants’ appeal by simply giving the reason 
that the CSRC issued a confirmation letter responding to the request of the Crime Investigation 
Bureau in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations. Nevertheless, the legality of the 
confirmation letter does not qualify it as evidence in court. Similar reasoning was given in the 
Baochun Liu and Qiaoling Chen insider trading case. xThe tendency of the absolute reliance on 
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the insider dealing confirmation letters of the CSRC as evidence in courts, in practical terms, results 
in the suspects and the defendants being less able to cross-examine the most significant aspects of 
their cases to defend their legitimate rights. 
Further, the over reliance on the confirmation letter of the CSRC as evidence does not conform 
with the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC. More specifically, using the confirmation letter of 
the CSRC as evidence conflicts with the definition of ‘evidence’ in the Criminal Procedure Law 
of the PRC. Article 54 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC provides that a people's court, a 
people's procuratorate, and a PSO shall have the authority to gather or require the submission of 
evidence from the relevant entities and individuals. The relevant entities and individuals shall 
provide true evidence. Physical evidence, documentary evidence, audio-visual recordings, 
electronic data, and other evidence gathered by an administrative authority in the process of law 
enforcement and case investigation may be used as evidence in criminal procedures. The courts 
may consequently use evidence gathered by an administrative authority in making decisions on a 
criminal case. Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the PRC defines what is admissible as 
evidence under the Criminal Procedure Law. The article qualifies only six categories of evidence 
that may be accepted in the courts. These are (1) physical evidence; (2) documentary evidence; (3) 
witness statement; (4) victim statement; (5) confession and defence of a criminal suspect or 
defendant; (6) expert opinion; (7) transcripts of crime scene investigation, examination, 
identification, and investigative reenactment; and (8) audio-visual recordings and electronic data, 
and all eight categories of evidence must be verified before they can be used as the basis for 
deciding cases. The official letter of a government agency does not fall into any of those categories, 
and no verification process is put in place to verify how conclusions are reached in those CSRC 
official conformation letters. 
Recommendation on improvement
Recommendation one: higher maximum term of imprisonment and fines
Unlike the maximum terms of imprisonment for insider dealing in the US and the UK—seven 
years and twenty years, respectively—China stipulates a lower term of five to ten years. While 
we accept that, in reality, it is unlikely that the courts will use the maximum penalty, the 
legislature in setting a level has a denouncery impact emphasising the seriousness of the offence 
(Rider, 1995). The maximum term of imprisonment for other crimes against property or public 
benefits is generally fifteen years in China. In light of this, the authors suggest that it would be 
appropriate to impose a term of imprisonment of five years, with a maximum of fifteen. 
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In terms of a monetary fine, the authors suggest bringing the monetary fine under article 180 of the 
CL 1997 in line with the SL 2020 including increasing the monetary fine from five times the illegal 
gain to ten times the illegal gain and matching up the amount of the monetary fine to SL 2020 
where the illegal gain could not be identified in a criminal normal insider dealing case, and to 
replace the fixed amount by an unlimited amount depending on the discretion of the judge in 
serious criminal cases. 
In article 180 of the CL 1997, there was merely a mention of an optional monetary fine of between 
one time to five times the illegal gain of normal insider dealing and a compulsory monetary fine 
of between one time to five times the illegal gain of severe insider dealing. There was no 
consideration of circumstances where illegal gains could not be identified. Meanwhile, article 
191 of the SL 2020 dramatically increased the cost for breaching insider dealing regulations by 
imposing a considerably greater monetary fine on insider dealing offenders. Where the amount 
of the illegal gain can be identified and calculated, the maximum administrative monetary fine 
that may be imposed on the offender is increased from five times the illegal gain to ten times the 
illegal gain. Where the illegal gain cannot be found or a sum of illegal gain lower than 500,000 
Yuan is found, a fine of more than 500,000 Yuan and less than five million Yuan will be imposed 
if the offender is a natural person, and a fine of more than 500,000 Yuan and less than two million 
Yuan will be imposed if the offender is a corporate person. Meanwhile, the minimum amount of 
the administrative monetary fine has been raised from 30,000 Yuan to 500,000 Yuan, and the 
maximum amount of the administrative monetary fine has been raised from 600,000 Yuan to five 
million Yuan; both indicate a more than ten-fold increase. 
On the one hand, illegal earnings should not be the only consideration here; avoided loss is also 
an objective of insider dealing. On the other hand, imposing a fixed fine is inflexible, and the 
current amount of the fine is insufficient to deter insiders from pursuing illegal benefits. 
Accordingly, this article suggests that it would be sensible to replace the fixed amount by the 
unlimited amount in serious criminal insider dealing cases, relying on the discretion of the judge. 
Meanwhile, the term ‘illegal earnings’ could be replaced by ‘illegal benefits’ to include earnings 
and avoided loss. It must always be remembered that insider dealing is an economic crime 
motivated primarily by financial gain. It is the dispropriate benefits that may be obtained as a 
consequence of abusing the opportunity that incentivise the misconduct. Therefore, attempting 
to deprive the wrongdoer of his or her ill-gotten gains is crucial. 
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Recommendation two: handing over the criminal investigation mission to the Crime Investigation 
Bureau and restrict the legal effect of the CSRC official confirmation letter in court
The current approach to the public enforcement of insider dealing violations relies heavily on 
the CSRC.  The limited investigative power and the geographically unbalanced allocation of 
investigative resources of the CSRC make it a much weaker investigator than the Crime 
Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security. The authors therefore suggest handing 
over the criminal investigation mission to the Crime Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of 
Public Security from the CSRC and leaving merely a technical support for the CSRC. 
Based on the illegality of the court’s absolute reliance on the CSRC official confirmation letter 
as evidence for the key facts of insider dealing criminal cases under the Criminal Procedure Law 
of the PRC, and the loss of the dependents’ legal right to question or challenge the evidence 
because of it, the authors call for a more restricted use of the CSRC official confirmation letter 
as evidence in court.
Concluding Observations
The enactment of the Securities Law 2020 prompts the necessity and urgency to review the 
criminal regulatory framework of insider dealing in China in addition to its administrative and civil 
regulatory framework for a holistic and streamlined approach in coping with insider dealing.
It is generally believed that the number of prosecuted insider dealing cases is far fewer than 
those that actually occur. The pattern of monetary punishments of the criminal insider dealing 
cases indicates that small fines have been imposed, most of which have only been equal to the 
illegal gains. To bring the law in line with the modern change of financial misconducts and the 
relevant new rules in the Securities Law 2020, a higher maximum term of imprisonment and 
much larger fines are recommended. 
An over-reliance on the CSRC in relation to criminal investigation, prosecution, and court trials is 
identified and criticised due to the limited investigative power and the geographically unbalanced 
allocation of investigative resources of the CSRC and the illegality of the court’s absolute reliance 
on the CSRC official confirmation letter as evidence under the Criminal Procedural Law. A more 
decentralised role of the CSRC in the public enforcement of criminal insider dealing cases is 
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suggested. The proactive utility of the criminal investigation expertise of the Crime Investigation 
Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security and exercising the courts’ discretion in criminal insider 
dealing cases are encouraged. 
Notes
i A Complete Collection of Laws, Rules and Regulations 137-173.
ii In an Opinions on Combating and Preventing Insider Dealing 2010, it required the collaboration of multiple 
government agencies, including the CSRC, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC).
iii Interview with Yixin Song, Senior Partner of Shanghai Xinwang Wenda Law Firm, (Telephone Interview, 15 
March 2012) 
iv Interview with Zixue Zhang, Commissioner the Administrative Sanction Committee of the CSRC, (Beijing, 
10 2012)
v Several Rules on the PSOs’ Handling of Economic Crime Cases 2005
vi Notice on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Criminal Procedure on the Crime Investigation 
Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security‘s Investigation of the Securities and Futures Related Criminal Cases 
2008
vii See <www.lawsdata.com> accessed 8 April 2020.
viii Wang Zhongyi & Wang Yihong [2016] Quanzhou City Intermediate People’s Court, Fujian Province, Min 
05 Xingchu, No 92
ix Opinions on Handling Securities and Futures Related Criminal Cases by the People’s Supreme Court, the 
Supreme people's procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security and the CSRC 2011
x Liu Baochun & Chen Qiaoling [2013] Nantong City Intermediate People’s Court, Jiangsu Province, Su Fa, 
No 201112
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